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Abstract
Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) is a matching problem which seeks a stable matching between in N women and N men. We pro-
pose a Lotka-Volterra Model(LVM) mapped from SMP. Further, we show the equilibria of LVM mapped from the stable matchings
of SMP are stable and those not corresponding to the stable matchings are unstable by the local stability analysis.
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1. Introduction
The Stable Marriage Problem (SMP) is a two-sided matching problem to ﬁnd a stable matching1. With N men and
N women given, a matching consists of N pairs of a man and a woman where each man and woman appear only once
in the matching. Each man has an ordered preferences without tie over all the women, and vice versa. The stable
matching is a matching without any blocking pair. The blocking pair is a pair in which a man prefers a woman to
his current partner and the woman also prefers the man to her current partner in the matching. At least one stable
matching is known to exist in SMP1,2. A stable matching can be obtained by Gale-Shapley Algorithm (GSA)2. In
GSA, men propose women and women accepts, rejects, or keeps as a pending proposal. This process is repeated until
each man can ﬁnd an woman who men accepts the proposal. SMP can be applied to several practical problems such
as assignments of medical intern to hospitals or an allocation of college students to college classes2.
Vande Vate formulated SMP as the mathematical programming problem3. He formulated SMP as a 0-1 integer
programming problem, and converted it to a linear programming problem by a linear relaxation. All extreme points
of this linear programming problem are expressed as integer values. Balinski and Ratier deﬁned an SMP graph and
suggested a graph theoretic approach4. Roth introduced a game theoretic framework to SMP5. He assumed a market
of marriages between men and women can be modeled as cooperative and strategic games.
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We studied an approach for SMP by mapping SMP to a dynamical system6. The dynamical system assumes
interactions between pairs, and that system is capable of choosing a matching (a set of pairs) among all possible pairs.
In order to express SMP as a dynamical model, we use the Lotka-Volterra model (LVM), in which blocking pairs feed
upon the pairs being blocked, and pairs sharing the same person must be excluded. We show that stable equilibria
corresponds to stable matchings in all the SMP instances with size of three by solving initial-value problems of the
proposed dynamical model.
In this study, we show the equilibria and these stability of SMP mapped to LVM(SMP-LVM) with size three or
less, and suggest the concrete values and the stability of the equilibrium in SMP-LVM.
Section 2 concisely introduces SMP. Section 3 deﬁnes LVM mapped from SMP. Section 4 investigates the local
stability of the dynamical model of SMP with size two and three.
Nomenclature
SMP Stable Marriage Problem
LVM Lotka-Volterra Model
GSA Gale-Shapley Algorithm
ODE Ordinary Diﬀerential Equations
SMP-LVM Stable Marriage Problem mapped to Lotka-Volterra Model
xm,v a variable called a pair variable indicating whether a pair (m,w) is in the matchingM (xm,w = 1)
or not (xm,w = 0).
2. Stable marriage problem
The original SMP consists of a set M containing N men and a set W containing N women. The number N of all
men or women is called as the size of SMP. Let all members p ∈ M ∪ W have a preference list containing all the
members in the opposite sex, denoted by symbol >p. In particular, a >p b indicates that a person p prefers a to b. A
matching is a one-one correspondence between the men and women and is a set of pairsM ⊆ M ×W.
If a man m and a woman w are paired inM, then m and w are called partners, and these partners inM are described
as one-to-one mappings between M and W by m = pM(w) and w = pM(m). A pair (m′,w′) ∈ M × W is a blocking
pair for a matchingM if
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
(i) (m′,w′) M and m′ ∈ M and w′ ∈ W
(ii) w′ >m′ pM(m′)
(iii) m′ >w′ pM(w′).
(1)
Table 1 shows an SMP instance of size three speciﬁed by the preference list (a) and (b). Each row shows the
preference order of a man to women in Table 1 (a). The leftmost woman in rows is the most preferable for each
man, and the rightmost woman in rows is the most undesirable for each man. Table 1 (b) shows preference order of a
woman to a man.
The stable matching in Table 1 is {(m1,w3), (m2,w1), (m3,w2)}. The matching {(m1,w3), (m2,w2), (m3,w1)} is not
the stable matching because the blocking pair (m3,w3) exists. Another two stable matchings are {(m1,w1), (m2,w2)
, (m3,w3)} and {(m1,w2), (m2,w3), (m3,w1)}. All the stable matchings are only those three stable matchings.
The rank of woman w in the preference of man m is deﬁned as Rankm(w) (m ∈ M,w ∈ W). For example, in Table 1,
Rankm1 (w3) = 1 and Rankm1 (w2) = 3. In the similar way, the rank of man m in the preference of woman w is deﬁned
as Rankw(m) (m ∈ M,w ∈ W).
As a special case of SMP, the preference matrix in SMP is a Latin square7,2. The Latin preference is deﬁned by
Rankm(w) = N + 1 − Rankw(m). For example, the preference in Table 1 is the Latin preference.
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Table 1. (a) Instance of the preference table of men. Each row express preferences of indicated man by the leftmost column. The second column
describes preferences of indicated man by the row. Each person of preferences is arranged from the left, in the order of an opposite sex from most
desirable to most undesirable.; (b) Instance of the preference table of women. Each row express preferences of indicated woman by the left most
column. Other deﬁnition in the table is same deﬁnition to Table (a).
(a)
Men’s preferences
m1 w3 w1 w2
m2 w1 w2 w3
m3 w2 w3 w1
(b)
Women’s preferences
w1 m3 m1 m2
w2 m1 m2 m3
w3 m2 m3 m1
3. Lotka-Volterra model mapped from stable marriage problem
3.1. Lotka-Volterra model
The Lotka-Volterra model shows a population dynamics of predator-prey interactions expressed as ordinary diﬀer-
ential equations (ODE)8,9. The ODE describes dynamics of interacting populations between predators and prey.
The original two populations model can be generalized to n populations model. The generalized Lotka-Volterra
model for n populations is of the form
dNi
dt
= Ni
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝ri +
n∑
j=1
ai jN j
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
The variable Ni denotes the density of the i-th species. The parameter ri is an intrinsic growth (or decay) rate of the
increasing prey population (or predator mortality rate). The interaction matrix ai j describes the eﬀect of the j-th upon
the i-th population, which is positive if it enhances the growth of i-th species and negative if inhibits it.
3.2. Formulation of the Lotka-Volterra model mapped from SMP
We regard a pair of a man and a woman as a species in Lotka-Volterra Model. An essential pair inhibits nonessential
pairs. As a result, the density of essential pairs increases while the density of nonessential pairs decreases. In SMP,
the nonessential pairs are:
• the polygyny or the polyandry pair,
• the blocking pair.
We map a speciﬁc LVM from an SMP of (2). We use a vector notation of the pair variables x = (xm,w)T ∈
R
|M|×|W | (m ∈ M,w ∈ W). If (m,w) ∈ M, then xm,w = 1 and if (m,w) M, then xm,w = 0. We expect that an attractor
of the LVM corresponds to the stable matching in SMP. To normalize the pair variables xm,w, the following logistic
equation can be used.
dxm,w
dt
=
(
1 − xm,w) xm,w (m ∈ M,w ∈ W). (3)
The vector x satisﬁes the constraint that one man pairs with only one woman and one woman pairs with only one
man in the matching. The pair of a man (woman) must inhibit other pairs including the man (woman). The equation
involves terms inhibiting the polygyny and the polyandry as follows:
dxm,w
dt
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝1 − xm,w −
∑
j∈W, jw
xm, j −
∑
i∈M,im
xi,w
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ xm,w (m ∈ M,w ∈ W). (4)
The constraint for men (women) is described by 3rd term (4th term) in (4). The pair satisfying the constraints (1) must
be inhibited by predator pairs. The predator may be speciﬁed by
{(m′, j)|(m′, j) ∈ M, (m′,w′) M,m′ ∈ M,w′, j ∈ W, j >m′ w′}, (5)
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or {(i,w′)|(i,w′) ∈ M, (m′,w′) M,m′, i ∈ M,w′ ∈ W, i >w′ m′}. (6)
In (5) and (6), (m′,w′) is a prey pair (blocking pair). Thus, involving there predator pairs and prey pairs leads to the
dynamical model as follows:
dxm,w
dt
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝1 − xm,w −
∑
j∈W, jw
xm, j −
∑
i∈M,im
xi,w
+
∑
w>m j
xm, j +
∑
m>wi
xi,w −
∑
j>mw
xm, j −
∑
i>wm
xi,w
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ xm,w (m ∈ M,w ∈ W).
(7)
The equations (7) can be simpliﬁed to:
dxm,w
dt
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝1 − xm,w − 2
∑
j>mw
xm, j − 2
∑
i>wm
xi,w
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ xm,w (m ∈ M,w ∈ W). (8)
We call the ODE (8) as SMP-LVM. The matrix form of the SMP-LVM is as follows:
dx
dt
= (e − Ax) x. (9)
Matrix A = {ai, j} is an interaction matrix. The column vector e consists of all one element e = (1, . . . , 1)T . The matrix
element ai, j with i = (m,w), j = (m′,w′) are:
a(m,w),(m′,w′) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if m = m′ and w = w′,
2 else if (w′ >m w and m = m′) or (m′ >w m and w = w′),
0 otherwise.
(10)
4. Equilibria of proposed model
4.1. Equilibria of SMP-LVM with size two
The proposed model (8) has the following two types of equilibria:
1) An equilibrium corresponding to a matching in the original SMP:
(a) the matching is stable,
(b) the matching is unstable,
2) An equilibrium which does not correspond to any matching.
In the following, we discuss above two types in details.
1) Let the right-hand side of (8) be F(x(t)). If
∑
j∈W
xm, j ≤ 1 and
∑
i∈M
xi,w ≤ 1 (∀m ∈ M,∀w ∈ W) and x(t) → v
(t → ∞) where v ∈ {0, 1}N2 , then F(v) = 0. Because v satisﬁes
∑
j∈W
vm, j ≤ 1 and
∑
i∈M
vi,w ≤ 1 (m ∈ M,w ∈ W),
∑
j∈W
vm, j =
∑
j′>mw
vm, j′ + vm,w +
∑
w>m j′′
vm, j′′ ≤ 1, (11)
∑
i∈M
vi,w =
∑
i′>wm
vm,i′ + vm,w +
∑
m>wi′′
vm,i′′ ≤ 1. (12)
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vm,w,
∑
j>mw
vm, j,
∑
i>wm
vi,w will converge on the value of the following pattern:
vm,w = 1,
∑
j>mw
vm, j = 0,
∑
i>wm
vi,w = 0,
vm,w = 0,
∑
j>mw
vm, j = 1,
∑
i>wm
vi,w = 0,
vm,w = 0,
∑
j>mw
vm, j = 0,
∑
i>wm
vi,w = 1,
vm,w = 0,
∑
j>mw
vm, j = 1,
∑
i>wm
vi,w = 1,
vm,w = 0,
∑
j>mw
vm, j = 0,
∑
i>wm
vi,w = 0.
(13)
Thus, in any cases of (13), F(v) = 0 is satisﬁed and hence v is an equilibrium.
The vector v is a matching of original SMP when
∑
j∈W
vm, j = 1 and
∑
i∈M
vi,w = 1 are satisﬁed. Because
∑
j∈W
vm, j = 1
and
∑
i∈M
vi,w = 1 which is stronger than the above
∑
j∈W
vm, j ≤ 1 and
∑
i∈M
vi,w ≤ 1, hence F(v) = 0. Thus the SMP-LVM
(8) has some equilibria corresponding to stable matchings of the original SMP.
For example, the model based on Table 2 has equilibria v = v∗1 = (1, 0, 0, 1)
T, v∗2 = (0, 1, 1, 0)
T corresponding
to the stable matching in the original SMP. Equilibria v corresponding to the matching which is not stable are v∗3 =
(1, 0, 0, 0)T, v∗4 = (0, 1, 0, 0)
T, v∗5 = (0, 0, 1, 0)
T, v∗6 = (0, 0, 0, 1)
T, and v∗7 = (0, 0, 0, 0)
T. Let us consider the local
stability of these equilibria. The Jacobian of this SMP-LVM is:
∂F
∂x
= J(x) =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 − 2xm1,w1 − 2xm1,w2 −2xm1,w1 0 0
0 1 − 2xm1,w2 − 2xm2,w2 0 −2xm1,w2
−2xm2,w1 0 1 − 2xm1,w1 − 2xm2,w1 0
0 0 −2xm2,w2 1 − 2xm2,w1 − 2xm2,w2
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (14)
The equilibria v∗1 and v
∗
2 are known to be locally stable, for the eigenvalue of Jacobian (14) is −1. Similarly, the
equilibria v∗3, v
∗
4, v
∗
5, v
∗
6 are not stable, for the Jacobian (14) has the eigenvalues 1,−1. The equilibria v∗7 is also locally
unstable because the eigenvalue of Jacobian (14) is 1.
2) The model (8) mapped from SMP with Latin preference may have an equilibrium v = αe where
α =
1
2N − 1 . (15)
For example, the SMP in Table 2 satisﬁes Latin preference: Rankm(w) = N + 1 − Rankw(m). The interaction matrix A
of the SMP-LVM (9) are shown below (16).
A =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 2 0 0
0 1 0 2
2 0 1 0
0 0 2 1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
(16)
Table 2. (a) instance of the preference table of men for SMP with size two; (b) instance of the preference table of women for SMP with size two
(a)
Men’s preferences
m1 w2 w1
m2 w1 w2
(b)
Women’s preferences
w1 m1 m2
w2 m2 m1
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The equilibrium v∗8 can be also obtained as v
∗
8 = A
−1e = 13e. By solving the characteristic equation of the Jacobian
(14), we can get the eigenvalues 13 ,−1,− 13 − 23 i,− 13 + 23 i. The equilibrium v is locally unstable.
4.2. Equilibria of SMP-LVM with size three
Table 4 shows all the equilibria and their stability of SMP-LVM (8) mapped from size three SMP. All instances of
SMP with size three are classiﬁed into six classes in the Table 3 by a homomorphism of the reduced stable marriage
graph10. All the equilibria corresponding to the stable matching in original SMP with size three or less is locally
stable from the result of Table 4. Other equilibria which is not related to stable matchings of the original SMP are
unstable. All the equilibria corresponding to the stable matching are also stable because the signs of the eigenvalues
of Jacobian matrix of the SMP-LVM are all negative.
Table 3. An instance from six classes classiﬁed according to a graph homomorphism of the reduced stable marriage graph, in SMP with size
three 10.
Class An instance from each class Stable matchings
1
Men’s preferences
m1 w1 w2 w3
m2 w1 w2 w3
m3 w1 w2 w3
Women’s preferences
w1 m1 m2 m3
w2 m1 m2 m3
w3 m1 m2 m3
{(m1,w1), (m2,w2), (m3,w3)}
2
Men’s preferences
m1 w2 w1 w3
m2 w1 w2 w3
m3 w1 w2 w3
Women’s preferences
w1 m1 m2 m3
w2 m2 m1 m3
w3 m1 m2 m3
{(m1,w1), (m2,w2), (m3,w3)},
{(m1,w2), (m2,w1), (m3,w3)}
3
Men’s preferences
m1 w1 w3 w2
m2 w3 w2 w1
m3 w2 w1 w3
Women’s preferences
w1 m3 m1 m2
w2 m2 m3 m1
w3 m1 m2 m3
{(m1,w1), (m2,w3), (m3,w2)},
{(m1,w3), (m2,w2), (m3,w1)}
4
Men’s preferences
m1 w1 w3 w2
m2 w3 w1 w2
m3 w2 w1 w3
Women’s preferences
w1 m3 m2 m1
w2 m2 m3 m1
w3 m1 m2 m3
{(m1,w1), (m2,w3), (m3,w2)},
{(m1,w3), (m2,w2), (m3,w1)},
{(m1,w3), (m2,w1), (m3,w2)}
5
Men’s preferences
m1 w1 w3 w2
m2 w2 w3 w1
m3 w3 w1 w2
Women’s preferences
w1 m2 m3 m1
w2 m3 m2 m1
w3 m1 m2 m3
{(m1,w1), (m2,w2), (m3,w3)},
{(m1,w3), (m2,w2), (m3,w1)},
{(m1,w3), (m2,w1), (m3,w2)}
6
Men’s preferences
m1 w3 w1 w2
m2 w1 w2 w3
m3 w2 w3 w1
Women’s preferences
w1 m3 m1 m2
w2 m1 m2 m3
w3 m2 m3 m1
{(m1,w1), (m2,w2), (m3,w3)},
{(m1,w2), (m2,w3), (m3,w1)},
{(m1,w3), (m2,w1), (m3,w2)}
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Table 4. All the equilibria in SMP-LVM with size three and their local stability. A element vi, j of 0-1 vector v indicates a pair variable between
mi (∈ M) and wj (∈ W). All the classes in Table 3 are shown. The column of the local stability shows the local stability of equilibria, and the sign
of these eigenvalues by Jacobian matrix. The rightmost column shows the number of equilibria which has the equivalent equilibrium pattern.
Class Equilibrium pattern Local stability Number ofequilibriumv1,1 v1,2 v1,3 v2,1 v2,2 v2,3 v3,1 v3,2 v3,3
common
to all the
classes
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 unstable (+) 1
only one pair vi, j = 1
unstable (−,+)
9
two pairs subjected to monogamous relationship 18
1 matchings with blocking pair 5all of the stable matchings stable (−) 1
2
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 0 0
unstable (−,+)
1
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 1
matchings with blocking pair 4
all of the stable matchings stable (−) 2
3
1/3 0 1/3 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 unstable (−,+) 1
matchings with blocking pair 4
all of the stable matchings stable (−) 2
4
2/23 7/23 5/23 7/23 0 9/23 5/23 9/23 0
unstable (−,+)
1
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 1/3 1/3 1
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 2
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 0 0 2
matchings with blocking pair 3
all of the stable matchings stable (−) 3
5
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 1/3 0 0 1/3 1/3
unstable (−,+)
1
13/73 17/73 15/73 17/73 5/73 29/73 15/73 29/73 0 1
2/23 7/23 5/23 7/23 0 9/23 5/23 9/23 0 2
matchings with blocking pair 3
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 4
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 0 0 4
all of stable matchings stable (−) 3
6
1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
unstable (−,+)
1
matchings with blocking pair 3
13/73 17/73 15/73 17/73 5/73 29/73 15/73 29/73 0 3
2/23 7/23 5/23 7/23 0 9/23 5/23 9/23 0 3
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 1 0 6
1/3 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0 0 0 6
all of stable matchings stable (−) 3
4.3. Diagram in SMP-LVM mapped from SMP with size two
Fig. 1 (a) and (b) depict the relation between initial values and equilibria in SMP-LVM of Table 2 by using the
decision making diﬃculty11. The initial values xm,w(0) of each pair variable in the SMP-LVM are speciﬁed by two
parameters rM and rW as follows:
xm,w(0) =
rM(n + 1 − Rankm(w)) + rW (n + 1 − Rankw(m))
2n
(m ∈ M,w ∈ W). (17)
rM (rW ) is a priority for weighting the initial values for males (females) ranging [0, 1].
Fig. 1 (a) shows the number of time steps required to reach an equilibrium using initial values given by (17). The
vertical axis is used to indicate rW and the horizontal axis is used to indicate rM in Fig. 1 (a).
Fig. 1 (b) shows the equilibria when the dynamics of SMP-LVM with initial values given by (17) converges.
In this ﬁgure, the vertical axis and horizontal axis are the same as the axes of Fig. 1 (a) and the colours denotes
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the equilibria exist in SMP-LVM of Table 2. Fig. 1 (b) shows convergences on four equilibria which are the most
preferred equilibrium v∗1 by women where rW > rM , the most preferred equilibrium v
∗
2 by men where rM > rW , the
equilibrium v∗7 of no pair where rM = rW = 0, the equilibrium v
∗
8 where rM = rW ( 0). These ﬁgures suggest that the
dynamics with initial values ranging between 0.0 and 1.0 converges on equilibria corresponding to stable matchings
except the case of all initial values be equal.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. (a) The ﬁgure shows solving step of SMP-LVM by each initial values. Horizontal axis of this ﬁgure indicates the priority rM of the initial
value for male, and vertical axis indicates the priority rW of the initial value for female. Colour of the graph is the number of steps required to
solve the initial-value problem speciﬁed by there rates ; (b) The ﬁgure shows equilibria by distinct colour of SMP-LVM for each initial value. The
horizontal and vertical axes are the same as (a).
5. Conclusion
This paper proposes a speciﬁc Lotka-Volterra Model mapped from the Stable Marriage Problem. The equilibria
corresponding to stable matchings in the original SMP of size two and three are locally stable. Similarly, the equilibria
corresponding to matchings with blocking pair are locally unstable. Furthermore, the SMP-LVM mapped from a size
N SMP with Latin preference has an unstable equilibrium ( 12N−1 , . . . ,
1
2N−1 ).
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